T2 FIX7 P0 Dry-Run / Execution-Readiness — Independent Review
T2 FIX7 P0 Dry-Run + Execution-Readiness — Independent Review (2026-06-11)
- Host: T2 / CLAUDE CODE / FABLE · Macro:
FIX7_P0_T2_INDEPENDENT_DRYRUN_EXECUTION_READINESS_REVIEW_MACRO_2026_06_11 - Authority of this doc:
REVIEW_NON_AUTHORITY. This review is not final production authority. It determines only whether T1's packet is ready for an owner/operator decision on a future implementation-execution-no-production macro. It authorizes nothing. - Final status:
T2_FIX7_P0_DRYRUN_EXECUTION_READINESS_REVIEW_PASS - Codex called: NO · Production mutation: NO · Implementation execution: NO · REAL_RUN/QT001/cutover: NO · Canonical fold: NO
- Machine form:
t2-fix7-p0-dryrun-execution-readiness-independent-review-2026-06-11.json
Method
Codex-style discipline: read actual governed KB files (not reports); fetch source bytes; recompute every tree independently in a clean /tmp; materialize T1's validator + 11 evidence JSONs and run them; reproduce T1's probes; author 22 probes beyond T1's harness; run an end-to-end tamper; characterize one hardening gap. KB files were all readable; 0 required inputs unreadable.
Table A — Authority / planning / dry-run verification
| Item | Required | Found in KB | Method | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
N7 envelope_manifest_sha256 |
efb0c574…1853d32 |
n7-approval-event.json |
fetched source JSON | MATCH |
N8 detached_seal_sha256 |
daa70c39…6117e1a1 |
n8-detached-codex-seal.json |
fetched source JSON | MATCH |
P7 authority_seal_pin_sha256 |
9ddb27c3…034550 |
p7-authoritative-pin.json |
fetched source JSON | MATCH |
| N8 embeds N7 digest | efb0c574… |
efb0c574… |
read | CONSISTENT |
| P7 embeds N7/N8/N6 | match | efb0c574 / daa70c39 / d777e87c |
read | CONSISTENT |
P7 implementation_authorized_by_p7_alone |
false | false | read | PASS |
P7 implementation_boundary |
execution blocked | IMPLEMENTATION_EXECUTION_REMAINS_BLOCKED; POST_SEAL_IMPLEMENTATION_PLANNING_ONLY_ALLOWED |
read | PASS |
| Seal packet tree | 3890cd34…2a234 |
3890cd34…2a234 |
shasum(KB HASH_MANIFEST) |
MATCH |
| Planning packet tree | f470d0d0…0fe8f |
f470d0d0…0fe8f |
shasum(KB HASH_MANIFEST) |
MATCH |
| Dry-run packet tree | 02b200e5…94e6 |
02b200e5…94e6 |
shasum(KB HASH_MANIFEST) |
MATCH |
| Evidence bundle tree | 1b824b91…ab26 |
1b824b91…ab26 |
shasum(KB HASH_MANIFEST) |
MATCH |
| Canonicalizer rev3 | 49c386a9…b734d0 / 38756 B |
DR-1 fresh-fetch + seal-consumption | read | CONSISTENT |
All four packet HASH_MANIFESTs were fetched full from KB, written to clean /tmp, and shasum -a 256 recomputed equal to the macro value, the packet_tree.sha256, and byte-identical to T1's local capsule _external/. KB file counts: dry-run 21, planning 16, seal 19, bundle 13. N7/N8/P7 are correct, and P7 alone does NOT authorize execution.
Table B — TKT Base L0–L3
| Level | T1 claim | Evidence | T2 verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| L0 FILE | PASS | shasum -c all OK; tree == packet_tree.sha256 |
CONFIRMED (4 trees recompute byte-exact) |
| L1 RECONSTRUCTION | PASS | RERUN PASS in fresh mktemp | CONFIRMED (KB reconstruct byte-exact) |
| L2 FAIL-CLOSED | PASS | 20/20 probes | CONFIRMED + 22 independent + tamper |
| L3 GOVERNANCE | PASS | 389..406, no collision, addendum, no fold | CONFIRMED |
| L4/L5/L6 | DEFERRED | — | CONFIRMED deferred |
| Ceiling | L3 | no IU/SEMANTIC/RELEASE/production claim | CONFIRMED — no overclaim |
Table C — Staging / production isolation
| Surface | Claimed | T2 check | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| workspace | /tmp/fix7p0-dryrun.J70a0q (mktemp) |
path starts /tmp/; validator gate passes |
PASS |
| is_production | false | gate | PASS |
| production PG / Directus | false / false | no query_pg / directus_* |
PASS |
| registry-row / system_issues | false / false | canonical registry untouched | PASS |
| REAL_RUN / QT001 / permit / activation / repoint / cutover | not invoked | forbidden-surface table | PASS |
All 11 forbidden surfaces touched=false. Isolation PROVEN.
Table D — Rollback proof
| Entry | Surface | before | apply | after_rollback | restored | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RB-2 | temp blueprint doc | ABSENT | 30bdca6e… |
ABSENT | true | PASS (additive→delete) |
| RB-3 | canon marker (temp copy) | 49c386a9…b734d0 |
91c520d9… |
49c386a9…b734d0 |
true | PASS — restored to P7 pin byte-exact |
| RB-4 | gov addendum stub | ABSENT | 1cddd95e… |
ABSENT | true | PASS (registry untouched) |
| RB-PROD | any production surface | DESIGN_ONLY_NOT_EXERCISED |
— | — | — | correctly deferred |
rollback_proof_status = PROVEN_IN_STAGING; production_rollback_status = NOT_APPLICABLE (no production mutated). Rollback is real in staging and production rollback is NOT overclaimed.
Table E — Bad-input / fail-closed
| Suite | Count | Result |
|---|---|---|
| validator on good data | 11 gates | PASS, exit 0 |
| T1 probes (reproduced) | 20 | 20/20 fail-closed, any_fail_open=false |
| T2 independent probes | 22 | 22/22 fail-closed |
| End-to-end tamper (P7 flip) | 1 | exit 1, no PASS/seal token leaked |
| Hardening probe (vacuous-mutation rollback) | 1 | gap — non-blocking (T2-REC-ROLLBACK-HARDENING-1) |
Every dangerous class (execution authorization, production leak, fabricated owner approval, canonical fold, object collision, production-rollback claim, IU/semantic/release overclaim) fails closed. The single hardening gap is a validator robustness limitation on a degenerate input class; it is not a defect in T1's actual evidence and admits no overclaim. See the probe report for detail.
Table F — Owner decision boundary
| Field | Required | Found | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
default_decision |
HOLD | HOLD | PASS |
execution_authorization_status |
NOT_AUTHORIZED | NOT_AUTHORIZED | PASS |
selected_option |
null | null | PASS |
owner_signature |
UNSIGNED | UNSIGNED | PASS |
review verdict |
valid, non-authority | READY_FOR_OWNER_EXECUTION_REVIEW |
valid (not production authority) |
Default HOLD is preserved; no owner approval is fabricated.
Overclaim scan
PRODUCTION_PASS — absent · SEMANTIC_TEXT_AS_CODE_PASS — absent · IU_TRACEABILITY_PASS — absent · RELEASE_BUNDLE_PASS — absent · implementation_execution_authorized=false · production_ready=false · production_rollback_proven=false. No semantic/implementation/production overclaim exists.
Anti-duplication (per URGENT ADDENDUM)
- Artifacts checked for existing equivalents: dry-run packet, execution-readiness packet, evidence bundle, owner-decision packet, planning packet, authority-seal packet — all already exist from T1.
- Duplicates avoided: I did not author a second dry-run, execution-readiness, evidence-bundle, or owner-decision packet. T2 produced only the 6 review-only deliverables.
- Duplicates found: none. Duplicates already created by T2: none.
- Resolution recommendation:
REVIEW_NOTE_ONLY— every T2 output is review-only and points to the existing T1 artifacts. - Objects marked DO_NOT_FOLD / SUPERSEDED: none.
- Deletion performed: NO (nothing to delete; no duplicate created; auditability preserved).
- Scratch note:
/tmp/t2-fix7-verifyand/tmp/t2-tamperare local-only verification scratch — not KB artifacts, not in any manifest/HASH_MANIFEST/packet_tree/checkpoint/current-state, not part of any evidence chain.
Verdict
T2_FIX7_P0_DRYRUN_EXECUTION_READINESS_REVIEW_PASS — Owner/operator may review whether to authorize a future AUTHORIZE_IMPLEMENTATION_EXECUTION_NO_PRODUCTION macro. This review does NOT authorize execution or production. Default remains HOLD.
Remaining blockers (carried; block the FUTURE execution macro, not this review or the dry-run)
| ID | Actor | Blocks |
|---|---|---|
FIX7-P0-PLAN-EXEC-AUTH-1 |
owner | implementation execution (OPT-4) |
FIX7-P0-PLAN-SURFACE-1 |
owner/operator | execution + production (birth surface scoping) |
FIX7-P0-PLAN-SURFACE-2 |
owner/operator | execution (CI config) |
FIX7-P0-PLAN-REALRUN-1 |
owner | execution (REAL_RUN) |
FIX7-P0-PLAN-SEPARATE-AUTH-1 |
owner | execution + production (QT001/apply/permit/activation/repoint/cutover) |
FIX7-P0-DRYRUN-PROD-ROLLBACK-1 |
owner/operator + separate prod auth | production (prod rollback proof) |
FIX7-P0-CODEX-REVIEW-ROUTE-1 |
owner | Codex runtime access only — NOT a content blocker; does NOT block the owner decision |
T2-REC-ROLLBACK-HARDENING-1 |
T1/owner | nothing now — recommended validator fix before the execution macro |
Minimal next macro
Owner/operator picks the post-dry-run decision (default HOLD). If AUTHORIZE_IMPLEMENTATION_EXECUTION_NO_PRODUCTION: a separately-authorized KB/governance-only execution macro after owner OPT-4 + production-surface scoping; REAL_RUN/QT001/permit/activation/repoint/cutover/production each still require their own separate authorization. Recommend folding T2-REC-ROLLBACK-HARDENING-1 into dryrun_validator.py first.