KB-36D6

T1 FIX7 Adversarial Review - 14 Risk Rollback (SUPERTRACK N)

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QT001FIX7T1riskrollbacksupertrack-n

14 — Risk & Rollback Review (SUPERTRACK N)

Source: 11-risk-rollback-no-go.md (+ 08, 09, 06).

Risk-register coverage (macro-required categories)

Category Covered? Where
hardcode recurrence yes engines no-CASE + sealed manifests
Directus mutation yes owner-only + REVOKE (operator-gated)
readiness denominator yes sealed exact-set + quorum-to-reduce
signoff spoof yes LOGIN identity + content-hash + self-sign block
fake capability yes controlled VERIFIER measurements
hash ambiguity yes canonical JSONB + pgcrypto; (key-maps unpublished)
dependency/callgraph limitation yes sealed analyzer + source-hash drift
TOCTOU yes control_epoch FOR SHARE/FOR UPDATE
manual SQL yes Level-B only; no psql/SSH/Directus fallback
privileged deploy yes quorum + production-owner environment
rollback yes layer-specific (below)
extension dependency yes PG16+pgcrypto NO-GO/operator-install (present live)
operator mistakes partial quorum + drift-invalidation reduce; two-distinct-login-roles-one-person residual not addressed → add operational control

Rollback coverage (macro-required layers)

Layer Rollback specified?
owner/ACL yes — owner-gated Level-B, epoch-incrementing
manifests yes — activate prior-payload version (no delete)
activation yes — readiness/manifest activation rollback
writer repoint yes — repoint to fail-closed stub
extension yes — operator Level-B install/remove
analyzer manifest yes — prior-version activation
readiness manifest yes — prior-version activation
evidence/signoff state yes — append-only revoke/supersede
epoch yes — never decrements (monotonic; rollback = new forward state)

Global no-go: missing rollback/evidence, unprovable sets, anchor drift, bypass, unknown dependency/evidence, bad quorum/freshness, missed 15-min verifier, pipeline unavailable/manual SQL. Unsafe restore → revoke writer + FIX7_FORWARD_COMPENSATION_BLOCKED.

Adversarial probes

  • Does rollback restore the safe-blocked state? Yes — rollback is fail-closed (writer → fail-closed stub; readiness false); it never restores an unsafe writer and never deletes history. The monotonic epoch (no-decrement, forward-compensation) is the correct pattern.
  • Residual: the two-distinct-login-roles controlled by one human quorum-defeat is not addressed (organizational control). Add to risk register.

Verdict: RISK_ROLLBACK_COMPLETE

Risk register and rollback are comprehensive and fail-closed across all required layers. One additive operational control to add (operator-mistake / single-human-two-roles). Rollback restores the safe-blocked state by design.

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