10 - SUPERTRACK J — Zero-Hardcode / Disguised-Hardcode Final Scan

Verdict: DISGUISED_HARDCODE_RISK (not HARDCODE_FAIL)

Consistent with my prior focused-review J verdict. The corrected package is impressively manifest-driven; there is no clear policy-literal-in-adapter FAIL. The residual risks are completeness/coverage holes that COULD harbor disguised hardcode if not closed.

Scan results (per the supertrack-J checklist)

• Fixed answers outside sealed manifest — NONE FOUND in the manifest/contract layer (all policy/threshold/identity/exact-set values are sealed rows).
• Policy-shaped CHECK — NONE (removed; verified in CP-01 review; self-review item 7 confirms left<>right CHECK removed → must_differ data + generic guard).
• Hidden CASE policy — NONE FOUND (seal functions fn_assert_catalog_family / fn_assert_typed_operand / generic rule evaluation explicitly hold no code/string literals and no CASE on codes).
• Numeric literal threshold as authority — NONE in adapters by rule (CP-05); structural-only literals permitted. BUT see retention surface below.
• Extra authority surface not counted in 27 — RISK (RP-02). The "ACTIVE sealed retention policy" (interval/capacity) is numeric authority not among the 27 and not reconciled with the "no 28th surface" invariant.
• Fixed partition policy not manifest-driven — ADDRESSED (fixed monthly replaced by sealed retention-policy interval) but unresolved as a counted/sealed surface (RP-02).
• Free-text operand authority — NONE (typed columns + compatibility + "JSONB cannot contain executable/free-form predicate text"; "scalar hidden in JSONB" is a negative test).
• Unsealed code catalog — NONE (catalog is owner-only, versioned, one-active, hash/quorum bound).
• Directus-editable authority — NONE (Directus SELECT-only on business base tables; no control-plane DML/DDL/ownership).
• Mutable denominator — CONTROLLED (readiness/bypass/hash denominators are ACTIVE manifest_set.expected_item_count + exact set; dashboard mutable-denominator is named as a guarded concern). Residual: confirm via RP-01 once the dashboard/export instance table is defined.
• Manual inventory as authority — NONE (exact-set seal compares child set vs envelope set in both EXCEPT directions).
• Regex/source-text as authority — NONE granting; SA15 source-text scan is used to BLOCK (fail-closed), which is acceptable defense-in-depth, not authority.
• Function/view existence as proof — NONE (proof is sealed rows + recomputed hashes + evidence, not object existence).
• Arbitrary reviewer/approver/provenance strings — NONE (identities are FK-bound to human_identity_registry/principal_registry; evidence is FK-bound immutable rows).
• MD5 / delimiter hash — NONE (explicitly forbidden; SHA-256 only; no delimiter concatenation).
• bool_and NULL-ignore — NOT OBSERVED in the corrected docs (readiness is exact-set/count-match framed); to re-confirm at the readiness-evaluator layer when instance tables land (RP-01).
• Routed-later without blocking-now — PARTIAL RISK. The retention-policy surface (RP-02) and the undefined instance/result tables (RP-01) are effectively "routed later"; they must be blocking-now for final approval, which this review enforces by withholding READY.

Latent surface to harden

• code_catalog_item.item_payload jsonb is descriptive-only by assertion but lacks structural/scan enforcement → RP-05 (a disguised-hardcode vector if any adapter reads operational values from it).
• Catalog-family enforcement contracts (reference_contract, operand_column_contract, SA15 structural-literal catalog) need enumeration + exact-set coverage → RP-04 (a missing contract row silently disables enforcement = disguised hole).

Conclusion

No HARDCODE_FAIL. The standing risks are RP-02 (uncounted retention authority surface), RP-04 (contract-coverage completeness), RP-05 (item_payload discipline), and the routed-later instance layer RP-01. Closing these moves J toward ZERO_HARDCODE_VERIFIED. Verdict: DISGUISED_HARDCODE_RISK.