01 — Production & Clone Safety Gates (Hard Gate 0)

Verdict: PASS. Production proven read-only-safe and byte-unchanged across the run; clone proven isolated, seeded, bounded, and reversible.

Channels (and the isolation that makes this safe)

DB	Channel	Mutability
production directus	query_pg MCP (read-only role, READ ONLY txn, 5s timeout, LIMIT 500)	read-only by construction — cannot DDL/DML
clone directus_gov_test_20260602	ssh contabo docker exec -i postgres psql -U workflow_admin -d directus_gov_test_20260602 -f -	read+write; every mutating script self-guards current_database() LIKE 'directus_gov_test_%'

The query_pg allowlist is ['directus','incomex_metadata','workflow'] — it cannot even see the clone. So the two channels are physically incapable of crossing: production proof is read-only-only; clone mutation rides a separate ssh channel that refuses to run anywhere but a clone DB. There is no single channel that can both read production and write it.

Production read-only check (entry, 2026-06-03)

#	check	required	actual
1	production DB = directus	directus	directus ✓
2	ownership rows = 0	0	0 ✓
3	gap = 210	210	210 ✓
4	os_proposal_approvals = 0	0	0 ✓
5	governance event emit = 0	0	0 ✓
6	axis tables absent	0	0 ✓
7	candidate/ruleset/worker state	0/0/0	0/0/0 ✓
8	idle-in-transaction = 0	0	0 ✓
9	no production write channel opened	—	none (query_pg read-only) ✓

Clone safety check (entry)

#	check	required	actual
1	clone DB = directus_gov_test_20260602	yes	yes ✓
2	clone isolated from app traffic	yes	separate DB in same instance; no app retargeting ✓
3	ownership seed + 100% collection coverage from prior run	own≥1, gap 0	own 30, gap 0 ✓
4	scanner candidate state bounded/idempotent	bounded	candidate_state 5 / candidate_object 35, cursor 1 ✓
5	event dispatch inert	0 gov emit	0 ✓
6	rollback/drop plan exists	yes	sql/Z_axis_substrate_drop_clone.sql (written before first commit) ✓
7	axis tables absent/known	absent	0 (clean slate) ✓
8	no uncontrolled worker loop	none	no daemon; scans are single deterministic passes ✓

Production re-verification (exit)

db=directus · ownership 0 · gap 210 · ospa 0 · gov_emit 0 · axis_tables 0 · candidate_state 0 · idle 0 — identical to entry. The clone build did not, and structurally could not, touch production.

Why persistent clone commits were authorized here (vs prototype's withhold)

The prototype withheld commit to avoid a misleading "island" schema implying an un-ratified ownership-model change. This run removes that objection two ways: (1) the mission explicitly authorizes persistent clone commits when isolated, reversible, and TEST_CLONE-marked; (2) the build uses a parallel axis_object_ownership table instead of ALTERing governance_object_ownership, so no pre-existing structure is changed and the existing pipeline is provably byte-intact. The "island" is therefore a clearly-labelled, self-contained, droppable test artifact on a non-production DB — not a silent schema mutation.