KB-BF35
MOWD Phase 1 — Risk & Sequencing Review (Branch J)
5 min read Revision 1
mowdphase1risksequencing2026-05-29
Branch J — Implementation Risk & Sequencing Review
Each risk: mitigation · phase · owner.
| # | Risk | Mitigation | Phase | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Over-engineering — 15 DOTs + 16 cols + 4 surfaces for 2 workflows | Ship read subset + EXTEND first; register mutating DOTs only when migration needs them; build UI surfaces incrementally (Surface 1/2 first). Columns are cheap (nullable); DOTs/views gated by demand. | P1 | GOV-MOW |
| R2 | User confusion — "design vs runtime", "MOWD vs MOW" | Doc 08 boundary + consistent language: MOWD = MOW subdomain, not a Mother. UI labels say "Design" everywhere; no runtime affordances rendered. | P1 | GOV-MOW |
| R3 | Data migration risk — wrong/duplicate IU mint, lost semantics | Inline text is short (max 67, 0 long-text); placeholder descriptions discarded not migrated; dedupe by semantic hash; per-batch dry-run + human review; reversible binds. | P1 | GOV-MOW + author |
| R4 | Lock/DDL risk — ALTER blocked by long txn / Directus migration | All additive nullable + FK NOT VALID (no rewrite/scan); lock_timeout=5s fail-fast; off-peak; confirm Directus idle. VALIDATE separately, one FK per tx (weaker lock). |
P1 | workflow_admin op |
| R5 | Governance bottleneck — council ≥2 cross-sign on every change | Two-tier: MOW-owner does binds/freeze without council; only activation/rollback/schema need council. Batch approvals per migration batch, not per step. | P1 | GOV-COUNCIL |
| R6 | Permission ambiguity — who can do what | Explicit approver matrix (doc 07 §5/6); backend-enforced per-row capability list (doc 04 §B); agent self-approval CHECK. | P1 | GOV-COUNCIL |
| R7 | Stale UI data — cockpit shows old gate/approval state | Every payload carries as_of/date_updated/gate checked_at; re-fetch on action; no optimistic governance updates. |
P1 | UI contract |
| R8 | DOT misuse — mutating DOT called outside flow / without test | Mutating DOTs gate on owner + (activation) approval + Điều-35 paired test; read vs mutate split in catalog; validate-before-activate. | P1 | GOV-DOT |
| R9 | Agent overreach — agent activates/approves | Council owns activate/rollback; automated-agent CHECK blocks approve/reject; agent limited to propose + read DOTs. | P1 | GOV-COUNCIL |
| R10 | Performance at 10k workflows — correlated subqueries, OFFSET paging | Pre-aggregated count join in v_mow_design_workflow (doc 04 §A); keyset pagination; indexed filter cols; page cap + refine guard; validation fn scoped per-workflow. |
P1→P2 | GOV-MOW |
| R11 | Composite event FK can't single-ref | Modelled as composite (event_domain_ref,event_type_ref) FK; VALIDATE last, after all event refs resolve. |
P1 | workflow_admin op |
| R12 | Forward-only rollback misunderstood | Rollback = version-pin to prior active_design_version, never destructive (Điều 30); freeze as emergency stop; documented in doc 07/09. |
P1 | GOV-COUNCIL |
| R13 | Scope creep into Phase 2 (triggers/assignee/hierarchy) | Explicit DEFER list (doc 01 §5, doc 08); Phase 2 tables via birth contract, separate ratification. | P2 | GOV-MOW |
Sequencing (critical path)
0. Human ratify (doc 01) [GOV-COUNCIL]
1. EXTEND commit off-peak (doc 02) [workflow_admin] — gated on 0
2. Register read DOTs (doc 03 §4) [GOV-DOT] — gated on 1
3. Stand up read models / Surfaces 1-2 (doc 04)[UI] — gated on 1
4. Pilot WF-001 bind+validate (doc 09) [GOV-MOW] — gated on 1,2
5. Governance drill on pilot (doc 07) [GOV-COUNCIL] — gated on 4
6. VALIDATE FKs off-peak (doc 02 §7) [workflow_admin]— gated on 4 (refs clean)
7. WF-002 migration batches (doc 05) [GOV-MOW] — gated on 4
8. Register mutating DOTs (doc 03 §5) [GOV-DOT+council]— gated on 5
9. Phase 1 acceptance (doc 06) [GOV-SIV] — gated on 6,7
→ Runtime phase entry criteria (doc 08 §4)
Risk review verdict
Complete. 13 risks with mitigation/phase/owner; critical-path sequencing with explicit gating dependencies. Dominant risks (R1 over-engineering, R4 DDL lock, R9 agent overreach) each have concrete, already-designed mitigations.