Internal Evidence Proof — rev4 Phase-2 Readiness (no Codex)
Internal Evidence Proof — rev4 Phase-2 Readiness
Macro:
PROGRAM_MACRO_CLOSE_PHASE2_OFFLINE_PACKET_MVP_READINESS_END_TO_END_2026_06_09. Purpose: internally prove — from KB readback, rev4 evidence, and self-test design — whether Phase 2 can proceed to an offline packet MVP prototype build without another Codex review at this step, or whether a genuine blocker remains. No Codex consulted. No production mutation. Date: 2026-06-09 · Authoritative source rule: KB-FIRST / PG-FIRST / NATIVE-DRIVEN / LOCAL-LAST. Every claim below cites a KB design doc (the rev4 corpus) or a sealed prior review. Local files used in this macro were working copies of KB-sourced content for analysis only; KB is SSOT. Final status:INTERNAL_PROOF_PARTIAL. Build-readiness decision: D — TRUE_BLOCKER (owner/operator + resource). The binding, internally-unprovable precondition is provisioning the deny-by-default sandbox host (M5 / B4′); the rev4 corpus also records B0‴ (Codex re-seal) as a precondition to any build, which only the owner may honor or consciously waive. Decision A (build now) is NOT reachable; B (rev5 repair) is NOT required; C (Codex) is a parallel gate, not the load-bearing blocker. Production mutation: NO. No build, no tool/schema/runner/sandbox, no install, no PG/Directus/registry/FS/system_issuesmutation, no FS-DOT/IU/detector/command/FIX7 invocation.writes_performed: only the KB design/report/checkpoint docs this macro was asked to produce.
0. Question this proof answers (and the honest answer)
Q: Can Phase 2 proceed to an offline packet MVP prototype build now, without another Codex review?
A (honest): No — but the reason is not Codex. Everything that is internally provable is closed (scope lock, blocker→test conversion, guard build requirements, negative-test coverage, Article 13 + Article 14 audits — all PASS at design/feasibility level). The single load-bearing precondition that cannot be proven or performed internally is the deny-by-default sandbox host that is the offline MVP's primary enforcement boundary (L1). It is — by rev4's own honest admission — specified, not deployed. Provisioning it is an owner/operator + resource action (rev4 plan M5; spec §2 honesty bound; §20 caveat). Until it exists, by the design's own fail-closed self-check the tool refuses to function (emits BLOCKED/exit 3 before any read — §12.4 / F23 / G5 / G12), and ~11 of the 45 acceptance tests cannot pass because their proof-of-block evidence (seccomp EPERM, mount table, env keyset) only a real sandbox can produce. The rev4 corpus additionally records B0‴ (Codex re-seal of the rev4 spec) as a precondition to any build — and the offline-packet architecture is a brand-new response to Codex's Gate-3 FAIL that no independent authority has reviewed. Honoring or waiving B0‴ is itself an owner authority decision. So the next step is an owner decision + provisioning, not an internally-authorized build, and not (by default) a Codex round.
Track 1 — KB readback and SSOT confirmation
All nine rev4 documents were read from KB (Incomex_KB MCP batch_read, full content, 2026-06-09). Local .md/.json copies under /tmp/rev4_docs/ were derived from that KB read for analysis only and are not authority.
| KB path | Exists | Version / status | Key constraints found | Local copy needed? | Contradiction vs index? | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
designs/…gap-only-scope-spec-rev4-2026-06-09.md |
YES | GAP_ONLY_SCOPE_SPEC_v0_1_REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX; mvp_implementation_allowed=false |
Offline/packet/non-gating model (§2); non-gating non-global denial (§4.0); deny-by-default sandbox §12.1 specified, not deployed (§2 honesty bound, §20); no SQL/no driver/no KB write/no network (§12/§18); B0‴ precondition to any build (§1/§22) | Working copy only | None | PASS |
designs/…gap-only-scope-spec-rev4-2026-06-09.json |
YES | rev4; valid JSON (25 keys); self_audit all PASS; sealed_decisions_intact=[B,C,D,G,H] |
Machine mirror matches the .md spec field-for-field; mvp_implementation_allowed:false; becomes_allowable_when = B0‴ AND B4′ |
Working copy only | None (mirrors .md) | PASS |
designs/fix7-read-report-pilot-design-rev4-…md |
YES | FIX7_READ_REPORT_PILOT_DESIGN_REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX |
Detection logic unchanged (Gate 5 PASS preserved); C1–C12 checks; Fixtures A/A′/B/C/D; proves_execution:false, proves_global_absence:false; reads packet, writes local report |
Working copy only | None | PASS |
planning/mvp-read-report-inspector-implementation-plan-no-code-rev4-…md |
YES | MVP_PLAN_REV4_DESIGN_ONLY; build BLOCKED until B0‴ (+B4′ for acceptance) |
13 modules allowed_actions ⊆ {READ_PACKET_ITEM, WRITE_LOCAL_REPORT}; gates G1–G12 (G5 sandbox-invariant primary); manual gates M1–M5 (M5 = owner provisions sandbox); negative tests N1–N32 |
Working copy only | None | PASS |
designs/acceptance-test-matrix-…rev4-2026-06-09.md |
YES | ACCEPTANCE_MATRIX_v0_1_REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX |
45 in-scope tests, each capability/bypass test tied to enforcement layer L1–L5 + block point + proof-of-block evidence; 11 deferred (D1–D11); #27 corrected to process-level egress | Working copy only | None | PASS |
reports/codex-fix-ledger-gap-only-spec-rev4-…md |
YES | CODEX_FIX_LEDGER_REV4_COMPLETE |
6 rev3 blockers → rev4 repair / residual risk / MVP still blocked? = Yes for all 6; gate-by-gate (Gate 3 & 7 FAIL → "feasible + specified", not closed) | Working copy only | None | PASS |
reviews/codex-checkpoint-packet-…rev4-2026-06-09.md |
YES | REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX (a packet TO Codex — not a Codex response) |
The one decision + six repairs; 7 adjudication points + 7 open questions (Q1–Q7) routed to Codex; disposition requested GAP_ONLY_SPEC_REV4_SEALED or RETURN_BLOCKERS |
Working copy only | None | PASS |
checkpoints/checkpoint-gap-only-spec-rev4-after-codex-guard-block-…md |
YES | REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX; MVP authorized: NO |
Self-audit 10/10 PASS at design/feasibility level; honest caveats (sandbox specified not deployed; B7 deferrals); next step = route packet to Codex | Working copy only | None | PASS |
00-index.md |
YES | Current phase GAP_ONLY_SCOPE_SPEC_v0_1_REV4_READY_FOR_CODEX; minimal next step = route rev4 packet to Codex (B0‴) |
Records the full rev1→rev4 lineage; rev2 and rev3 T1 self-audits ("all-PASS"/"10/10") were each overturned by Codex | Working copy only | None | PASS |
Track 1 verdict: PASS. Nine of nine rev4 documents exist on KB, are mutually consistent, and agree with the index. No document is missing; no contradiction found. SSOT confirmed: the rev4 corpus is the governing design. One critical clarification surfaced by readback: the document titled “Codex checkpoint packet rev4” is a request addressed to Codex; Codex has not responded to it (consistent with the macro premise “Codex was NOT consulted with PROGRAM_CODEX_RESEAL…REV4…”). Therefore no rev4 Codex seal exists; B0‴ is open.
Track 2 — Phase 2 status map
| Bucket | Items |
|---|---|
| Already complete (internal, design-level) | rev4 Gap-only Scope Spec (+JSON mirror, validated); rev4 FIX7 pilot design; rev4 MVP plan (modules, G1–G12, M1–M5, N1–N32); rev4 acceptance matrix (45 tests, L1–L5, proof-of-block); rev4 fix ledger (6 blockers mapped); rev4 Codex checkpoint packet (authored, not yet sent/answered); rev4 checkpoint; index updated. This internal proof (scope lock, blocker→test conversion, guard requirements, negative coverage, Art 13/14 audits) — all PASS. |
| Remains before MVP build | (a) Owner/operator provisions the deny-by-default sandbox host (rev4 spec §12.1; plan M5) — the L1 primary boundary. (b) Owner disposition of B0‴ (route rev4 to Codex or owner-waive). (c) Build the guard harness + modules (next macro). (d) Run the enforcement-bound negative tests against the real sandbox (B4′ / M3). |
| Deferred after MVP (named contracts, B7 / Call Contract) | Live governed export step + named-query-catalog/driver/network-policy contract; path-scoped server-enforced KB report writer; downstream consumer/authority contract (any gate use); command run + exit capture (Call Contract); proof-of-run / global-absence; --selftest N/N+module_sha256; generic package_manifest schema; audit_dead_links()→system_issues; Directus write; TAC↔IU bridge; OPA/Conftest/Squawk/CI; positive verdict + exit 0 (sealed taxonomy authority). |
| Requires Codex | B0‴ — re-seal of the rev4 offline-packet architecture (a new response to the Gate-3 FAIL that no independent authority has reviewed); the 7 open questions Q1–Q7 in the rev4 checkpoint packet (esp. Q1 offline-vs-online, Q4 “specified-not-deployed seal basis”, Q6 manual-packet KB-first honesty, Q7 “any remaining assertion-as-guarantee”). These are authority judgments — but the owner may honor or waive them. |
| Requires owner/operator decision | Provisioning the sandbox host (M5) — resource + operator action; load-bearing and internally unprovable. B0‴ disposition (honor Codex vs waive) — owner authority. M4 owner confirmation of the read-only/write-local envelope. |
| Can be closed internally now (this macro closes them) | Scope lock (Track 3); Codex-blocker → build-acceptance-test conversion ledger (Track 4); guard build-requirement mapping (Track 5); negative-test coverage matrix (Track 6); Article 13 audit (Track 7); Article 14 audit (Track 8); the build-readiness determination (Track 9); the action-ready blocker packet (Track 11). All closed below. |
Track 3 — Rev4 scope lock (proved from KB)
Each MVP property is proven from a named rev4 section. Implication = what it means for the future build.
| Scope property | Evidence (rev4) | Status | Implication for build |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offline / packet-derived | spec §2 (Option B), §9; plan §3; pilot §3; JSON decisive_decision.input |
PASS | Tool reads a governed-provenance packet from a read-only input mount; no live surface. |
| Non-gating | spec §4.0 (decision_effect=NONE, may_gate=false); matrix #20; plan G8 |
PASS | Output may route to humans; must never wire to an allow/deny/build-break. |
| No network | spec §12.1 (no network namespace), §12.3; matrix #27; JSON capability_model…no_network |
PASS | Enforced by absence of a network namespace (L1), not a client promise. |
| No PG driver | spec §12 (OPEN_DB_DRIVER prohibited); matrix #30; plan G4 |
PASS | No DB client import; build-rejected if present (L2) + no route (L1). |
| No live query | spec §12 (LIVE_PG_QUERY prohibited), §12.6; matrix #35 |
PASS | All PG reads belong to the deferred export step (B7), never the tool. |
| No KB write | spec §10 / §13 (“MVP does NOT write KB”); matrix #34; plan §12 | PASS | Writes only the local output mount; KB upload is a separate governed/manual step. |
| No secret access | spec §12.1 (scrubbed env, no secret mounts); matrix #28 | PASS | Enforced by filesystem namespace + env scrub (L1); F25/G12. |
| No arbitrary local FS | spec §12.1 (only RO input + WO output mounts); matrix #29 | PASS | open() outside the two mounts ⇒ ENOENT/EACCES (L1). |
| Local report output only | spec §10; plan §4; pilot §5 | PASS | report.md+report.json+checkpoint-<name>.md to the WO output mount only. |
| No command execution | spec §12 (EXECUTE_COMMAND/SPAWN_SUBPROCESS prohibited); matrix #25 |
PASS | seccomp execve deny (L1) + import denylist (L2). |
| No mutation | spec §18; plan §4; JSON production_mutation:false |
PASS | No PG/Directus/registry/FS/system_issues write; writes_performed[] = local triplet only. |
| No authority creation | spec §4.0/§16.1 (PROVISIONAL_NON_AUTHORITY, report is evidence-only); matrix #18 |
PASS | Inspector taxonomy is never runtime truth; never a gate; never global-truth. |
Track 3 verdict: PASS (12/12). The rev4 scope is locked to exactly the offline/packet/non-gating/no-network/no-driver/no-live-query/no-KB-write/no-secret/no-arbitrary-local-FS/local-report-only/no-command/no-mutation/no-authority envelope the macro requires. Caveat (not a scope defect): every “no-X” guarantee above whose enforcement layer is L1 is structurally real only when the sandbox host exists. That is the Track 9 blocker, not a scope gap.
Track 4 — Codex rev3 blocker closure ledger
For each of the six rev3 blockers: rev4 repair · evidence basis · residual risk · Codex still needed? · build-acceptance test that proves it.
| # | Blocker (rev3 re-seal) | rev4 repair | Evidence basis | Residual risk | Codex still needed? | Build-acceptance test |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Negative verdicts → shadow denial authority | Non-gating non-global denial contract: decision_effect=NONE, may_gate=false, 5 bounded scoped verdicts, scope_of_denial, non-global disclaimer, READ_LEVEL_FAIL=“not acceptable for PASS” |
spec §4.0; F21/F22/F24; JSON non_gating_non_global_denial_contract |
A future consumer could still misuse a non-gating output as a gate until a consumer contract is sealed (B7) | Authority judgment — is decision_effect=NONE+may_gate=false sufficient? (Q2) Owner may waive |
#18, #20, #21, #22, #23, #45 (L4) |
| 2 | DB allowlist ≠ process egress allowlist | Offline: no network namespace; nothing to allowlist; egress denied at the environment | spec §12.1; §12.3; matrix #27 (process-level egress, not a gateway allowlist) | Sandbox host must actually be provisioned with no network namespace; mis-provisioning ⇒ egress | No (structurally collapsed) — but depends on M5 provisioning | #27, #35 (L1) — proof = socket/connect EPERM, no route |
| 3 | No sandbox for secret/local/network | Deny-by-default sandbox named (no-net ns; RO input mount; WO output mount; no secret mounts; scrubbed env; seccomp execve/socket/connect/ptrace); in-process guards demoted to secondary | spec §12.1–§12.4; plan G5; JSON enforcement_substrate_primary_sandbox |
Sandbox is specified, not deployed — must be provisioned + negative-tested | No (design feasible) — but the deploy is the blocker (M5/B4′) | #25, #28, #29, #33, #37 (L1/L3) |
| 4 | No bounded KB writer | MVP does not write KB; local output only; KB upload separate governed step; no writer claimed | spec §10/§13; plan §12; matrix #34 | Manual KB upload is outside the tool’s guarantees (a human/governed step) | No — honest deferral (B7); acceptance does not depend on it | #34 (L1+L2) — proof = no KB-write SDK import + no network |
| 5 | SELECT-only ≠ side-effect-fn safe | MVP issues no SQL; deferred export step = named query IDs only, side-effect-free, no raw/dynamic/multi/CALL/DML/DDL | spec §12.6; matrix #31 (MVP), #32→D9 (export) | Side-effect-function rejection now lives in the export-step contract (B7) — deferred, not closed | No for the MVP; Yes/contract for the export step (B7) | #31 (L1/L2, MVP) ; #32 → D9 (L5, deferred) |
| 6 | Tests not tied to enforcement | Every negative test bound to L1–L5 + block point + proof-of-block evidence; #27 corrected to process-level egress | matrix §3–§6; fix ledger §1 | Tests are specified, not run — must pass against a real sandbox (B4′) | No (mapping complete) — but execution depends on M5 | The whole matrix #18–#45 + invariants I1–I12 |
Track 4 verdict: PASS / PARTIAL. Every blocker is either (a) structurally collapsed by the offline re-scope (2, 3, 5 for the MVP), (b) converted into a concrete build-acceptance test (all six map to named matrix tests), or (c) honestly deferred behind a named contract (4 → no-writer; 5 export half → B7). None is "resolved by rev4 evidence" to the point of unblocking the build — the fix ledger itself answers "MVP still blocked? = Yes" for all six. The residual is not new design work; it is (i) deploy the sandbox (M5/B4′) and (ii) the recorded B0‴ authority gate. Of the residual "Codex still needed?" answers, none is a hard Codex dependency the owner cannot waive — but each is an authority judgment, which is why Track 9 = D (owner decides), not A (internally settled).
Track 5 — Guard build requirements (rev4 guard design → explicit, testable build requirements)
| # | Guard requirement | Enforcement layer | Implementation requirement | Negative test ID | Expected proof-of-block artifact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Offline execution only | L1 (primary) | Run with no network namespace (or all egress denied at namespace/host firewall) | #27, #35 / N22 | socket/connect EPERM; no route exists |
| 2 | No network namespace | L1 | Container/OS run profile omits the network namespace | #27 / N22 | namespace listing shows no net ns; socket EPERM |
| 3 | Read-only input mount | L1 | Bind-mount only the input-packet dir, ro |
#29, #33 / N24 | mount table: input mount = ro; write ⇒ EROFS |
| 4 | Write-only output mount | L1 | Bind-mount only the report-output dir, writable; nothing else writable | #33 / N28 | mount table: output mount sole writable path; elsewhere EROFS/EACCES |
| 5 | No secret mounts | L1 | No home / /etc secrets / project tree in the FS namespace |
#28 / N23 | FS namespace listing = {RO input, WO output}; no credential files |
| 6 | Scrubbed environment | L1 | Strip all creds/tokens/conn-strings/secret env vars | #28 / N23 | env keyset snapshot shows no secret vars |
| 7 | Block subprocess/exec/spawn | L1 (seccomp) + L2 (denylist) | seccomp deny execve/execveat; build-reject subprocess/os.system/os.exec*/pty/shell imports |
#25 / N20 | seccomp EPERM on execve + build-time import rejection |
| 8 | Block socket/connect | L1 | seccomp deny socket/connect/bind |
#27 / N22 | socket/connect EPERM |
| 9 | Block dynamic import / plugin loading | L2 | build-reject importlib/__import__ dynamic loaders |
#26 / N21 | build-time rejection; no dynamic-import capability |
| 10 | Block direct PG driver | L2 + L1 | build-reject any DB driver import; even if present, no network to connect | #30 / N25 | build-time rejection (no driver import) |
| 11 | Block raw SQL | L1/L2 | no SQL string / no DB client anywhere in the build | #31 / N26 | absence of SQL string / DB client in build artifact |
| 12 | Block arbitrary local read | L1 | only the RO input mount visible | #29 / N24 | FS namespace listing = two mounts only; open() outside ⇒ ENOENT/EACCES |
| 13 | Block output path escape | L1 | only the WO output mount writable | #33 / N28 | mount table + write-attempt error (EROFS/EACCES) |
| 14 | Fail closed on guard failure | L3 (P1 self-check) | assert capability envelope + sandbox invariants at startup; any deviation ⇒ exit 3 before any read | #37 / F23 | capability_envelope_attestation records the failed invariant; exit 3 |
Track 5 verdict: PASS (14/14 mapped to a layer + implementation requirement + test + proof artifact). Hard dependency: requirements 1–8, 12, 13 are L1 (host-sandbox) — they are design-complete and testable but only enforceable once the sandbox host is provisioned (M5). Requirements 9–11 are L2 (build-time, provable without a live sandbox). Requirement 14 is L3 (in-process). This is the precise reason the build cannot be accepted without M5.
Track 6 — Negative-test completeness (16 attack classes → coverage)
| Attack class | Covered? | Test ID(s) | Enforcement layer | Expected verdict | Proof artifact | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| shell / subprocess | YES | #25 / N20 | L1+L2 | exit 3 / build reject | seccomp EPERM execve + build reject |
none (needs live sandbox to prove L1) |
| dynamic import / plugin | YES | #26 / N21 | L2 | build reject / exit 3 | build-time rejection | none (L2 provable pre-sandbox) |
| network | YES | #27 / N22 | L1 | exit 3 | socket/connect EPERM, no route |
needs live sandbox to prove |
| secret / env credential | YES | #28 / N23 | L1 | BLOCKED_BY_UNSAFE_ACCESS / exit 3 |
env keyset + FS namespace | needs live sandbox |
| arbitrary local file read | YES | #29 / N24 | L1 | BLOCKED_BY_UNSAFE_ACCESS / exit 3 |
FS namespace = two mounts | needs live sandbox |
| direct PG driver | YES | #30 / N25 | L2(+L1) | CONTRACT_VIOLATION_IN_DESIGN (build) |
build-time rejection | none (L2 provable) |
| raw SQL | YES | #31 / N26 | L1/L2 | n/a (no path) | no SQL/DB client in build | none |
| side-effect SELECT | DEFERRED | #32 → D9 | L5 (export, B7) | rejected at export-contract review | query-catalog review record | honest deferral — not in MVP; tested at the export contract |
| KB writer claim | YES | #34 / N29 | L1+L2 | BLOCKED_BY_UNSAFE_ACCESS / exit 3 |
no KB-write SDK + no network | needs live sandbox for L1 half |
| output path escape | YES | #33 / N28 | L1 | BLOCKED_BY_UNSAFE_ACCESS / exit 3 |
mount table (WO only) | needs live sandbox |
| local-first authority | YES | #38 / N30 | L4 (G10) | FLAG_LOCAL_FIRST_AUTHORITY / FAIL |
item lacks governed provenance; CONFLICT→prefer KB/PG |
none (L4 provable on packet) |
| shadow denial wording | YES | #22, #45 / N18 | L4 | FLAG_GLOBAL_DENIAL_WORDING / FAIL |
output lint flags global negative | none |
| hardcoded denominator | YES | #9 / N9, N10 | L4 (G1/G2) | FLAG_HARDCODED_DENOMINATOR / BLOCKED |
no denominator_source_record; collapsed DOT number |
none |
| fake-green | YES | #1, #3, #19, #36 / N11 | L2/L4 | build/output reject | no positive enum / no exit-0 path | none |
| evidence reference without adequacy | YES | #4, #5, #6, #7 / N2, N3 | adequacy chain (§3 iron law) | INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE_FOR_CLAIM |
resolves-but-incapable per §3 step 5 | none |
| FIX7 artifact not adequately evidenced | YES | #41–#45 / N8 | adequacy chain + L4 | READ_LEVEL_FAIL/UNVERIFIED + NOT_PROVEN |
Fixtures A/A′/B/C/D; NOT_EVIDENCED_IN_ALLOWED_SURFACES not "absent" |
none |
Track 6 verdict: PASS. All 16 classes are covered: 15 in the MVP, 1 (side-effect SELECT) honestly deferred to the export-step contract (L5/B7) because the MVP issues no SQL. The only systematic "gap" is that the L1-layer proofs cannot be demonstrated without the provisioned sandbox — a deploy gap (Track 9), not a coverage gap.
Track 7 — Article 13 audit (PG-first / native / driven)
| Check | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| KB/PG/native source first | PASS | spec §0; authority traces to KB/PG/native via per-item packet provenance (§9, §16.1). |
| Local-last | PASS | spec §0.2 (“local is NOT authority”); JSON operating_rule.local_filesystem = NOT_AUTHORITY. |
| No shadow SSOT | PASS | spec §4.0/§16.1: inspector taxonomy is PROVISIONAL_NON_AUTHORITY, decision_effect=NONE, demoted below KB/PG/native; matrix #18. |
| Offline packet must be KB/PG-derived with provenance | PASS | spec §9: each item carries {governed_surface, named_query_id_or_kb_path, observation_ts, source_revision, content_hash}; provenance-less item ⇒ NOT_EVIDENCED_IN_ALLOWED_SURFACES (#39). |
| No arbitrary local-first path | PASS | spec §12 (READ_LOCAL_PATH_OUTSIDE_INPUT_MOUNT prohibited); G10; #38. |
| Local output is evidence only | PASS | spec §13/§16: report is evidence-only, non-authority, regardless of location. |
| No live PG claim in the MVP | PASS | spec §9.1 honest correction + §12.6: live read confined to the deferred governed export step; the MVP performs none. |
| This macro itself honored KB-first | PASS | Every claim cites a rev4 KB doc; local /tmp copies were analysis-only working copies of the KB read; no local-first authority used. |
Track 7 verdict: PASS. Residual honesty item (Codex Q6, owner-judgable): the manual-governed-packet bootstrap (§12.6: a human hand-assembles the packet until the export step is sealed) is the one place a local-first surrogate could slip in. rev4 mitigates it structurally (per-item provenance + G10 + tests #38/#39/#40), so it is PASS at design level — but whether that mitigation is accepted is an authority call deferred with B0‴/B7.
Track 8 — Article 14 audit (executable / evidence-backed; no fake-green)
| Check | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| No prose-only PASS | PASS | spec §4.2 FLAG_PROSE_ONLY_PASS; pilot C4; matrix #13. |
| No fake-green | PASS | spec §11: no exit 0; §4.4: READ_LEVEL_ACCEPTABLE removed; matrix #1/#3/#19/#36. |
| No claim without adequacy | PASS | spec §3 7-step adequacy chain; §3.IRON: a resolving reference yields only ARTIFACT_EXISTENCE_EVIDENCE. |
| Evidence reference alone insufficient | PASS | spec §3 step 5 (capability) + §4.1; pilot C5 (wrong-kind .md). |
| Execution claim cannot become acceptable without run evidence | PASS | spec §4.3 ARTICLE14_NOT_PROVEN_EXECUTION_UNVERIFIED forced for any execution claim; ceiling UNVERIFIED. |
| FIX7 Recheck-8 class caught at read/report level | PASS | pilot §3.2 + Fixtures A/A′/B/C/D (#41–#45); the .py SSOT case resolves only as wrong-kind .md ⇒ INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE_FOR_CLAIM. |
| No global-denial overclaim | PASS | spec §4.0 + FLAG_GLOBAL_DENIAL_WORDING (F21); pilot honesty bound: never "does not exist anywhere." |
| This proof makes no fake-green claim | PASS | Final status is INTERNAL_PROOF_PARTIAL, decision D; the proof explicitly refuses to declare the build authorized (completion contract honored). |
Track 8 verdict: PASS (preserved + strengthened). The offline-packet provenance strengthens the Article-14 "governed surface" test (existence must resolve on a governed-provenance item). Self-applied Article 14: this very proof would itself be a fake-green if it declared Decision A — so it does not (see Track 9).
Track 9 — Build-readiness decision
Decision: D — TRUE_BLOCKER (owner/operator + resource).
Why not A (BUILD_OFFLINE_MVP_PROTOTYPE_NEXT)
A requires all of: core constraints explicit ✓, guard requirements testable ✓, negative tests mapped ✓, no authority decision remains ✗, and Codex-not-required-because-offline. It fails on "no authority decision remains" and on a true resource gate:
- The corpus records B0‴ (Codex re-seal) as a precondition to ANY build — spec §1/§22, plan §5/M1, JSON
becomes_allowable_when, index minimal-next-step. The offline-packet architecture is a new response to Codex's Gate-3 FAIL and has never been reviewed by any independent authority. - Empirical evidence in the KB: rev2's "all-PASS" self-audit and rev3's "10/10 PASS" self-audit were each overturned by Codex (index lineage). So "T1 self-audit PASS" is not a reliable proxy for build-readiness — declaring A on the strength of this proof's PASSes would repeat exactly that error and violate Article 14 (no overclaim) and the standing feedback against self-certifying authority.
- A true resource blocker exists independent of Codex: the L1 sandbox host is specified, not deployed; building "to acceptance" is impossible without it; and by the design's own P1 self-check an un-sandboxed run fails closed to
BLOCKED/exit 3 (§12.4/F23/G5/G12) — a no-sandbox prototype refuses to function.
Why not B (REV5_REPAIR_REQUIRED)
No rev4 design defect or wording gap was found in this readback. The spec, JSON mirror, plan, matrix, fix ledger, and pilot are mutually consistent; verdict model, enforcement layers L1–L5, gates G1–G12, and tests N1–N32 / #1–#45 all align. A rev5 edit would not unblock the build, because the blocker is resource + authority, not design.
Why not C (CODEX_CHECKPOINT_REQUIRED_NOW) as the primary call
The user is explicitly reducing Codex dependency, and the load-bearing, internally-unprovable blocker is not Codex — it is the owner/operator sandbox host (M5/B4′). Even if Codex sealed rev4 today, the MVP still could not be accepted without that provisioning, and per spec §21 the readiness "hard fallback to B" (stay blocked) applies if no sandbox host can be provisioned. B0‴ is a parallel authority gate the owner may honor or consciously waive — which makes the immediate decision an owner decision, i.e. D, not an automatic Codex round (C). C remains the path if the owner chooses to honor B0‴.
What D means concretely (the binding gate)
The next step is an owner/operator decision + resource action, not an internally-authorized build:
- Load-bearing: provision the deny-by-default sandbox host per spec §12.1 (no network namespace; RO input mount; WO output mount; no secret mounts; scrubbed env; seccomp
execve/socket/connect/ptracedeny) — plan M5 / B4′. Without it the offline MVP's primary boundary cannot exist and ~11 acceptance tests cannot pass. - Authority: owner disposes of B0‴ — either route the rev4 packet to Codex (honor the recorded gate) or owner-waive it, accepting the documented risk that the offline-packet architecture is unreviewed and that prior self-audits were overturned.
Track 9 verdict: D — TRUE_BLOCKER. The internal proof is complete for everything internally provable; the remainder is an irreducible owner/operator gate, recorded action-ready in Track 11.
Track 10 — Build prompt packet
NOT PRODUCED. Track 10 is conditional on Decision A. Decision is D, so no build-offline-packet-mvp-prototype-program-macro-prompt-2026-06-09.md is written. (Producing a "build now" prompt would contradict the recorded B0‴ gate and the un-provisioned sandbox, and would be a fake-green.) The build prompt becomes appropriate only after the owner provisions the sandbox host and disposes of B0‴ (Track 11 B-EXT-1/B-EXT-2).
Track 11 — Action-ready blocker packet (summary; full packet is a separate deliverable)
See checkpoints/action-ready-blockers-after-internal-proof-rev4-2026-06-09.md. Headline blockers:
| ID | Blocker | Owner/Codex/operator | Blocks build or only future phases? |
|---|---|---|---|
| B-EXT-1 (load-bearing) | Deny-by-default sandbox host not provisioned (L1 primary boundary; "specified, not deployed") | Owner/operator (resource) | Blocks build acceptance (M5/B4′) |
| B-EXT-2 | B0‴ rev4 Codex re-seal open (offline-packet architecture unreviewed); owner may honor or waive | Owner authority (→ Codex if honored) | Blocks build start per corpus; owner-waivable |
| B-DEF-1 | Live governed export step + named-query-catalog/driver/network-policy | Owner + Codex (B7) | Future phase only (MVP uses manual packet) |
| B-DEF-2 | Path-scoped server-enforced KB report writer | Owner + Codex (B7) | Future phase only (MVP writes local) |
| B-DEF-3 | Downstream consumer/authority contract (any gate use) | Owner + Codex (B7) | Future phase only |
| B-DEF-4 | Call Contract / proof-of-run / global-absence | Owner + Codex (B1/B2/B3) | Future phase only (execution surface) |
Track 12 — Self-verification before final
| Item | Verdict |
|---|---|
| KB readback | PASS (9/9 docs, consistent) |
| Rev4 scope lock | PASS (12/12) |
| Codex blocker closure ledger | PARTIAL (6/6 mapped to repair + test; all "MVP still blocked = Yes"; honest deferrals named) |
| Guard requirements mapped | PASS (14/14 → layer + impl + test + proof) |
| Negative coverage | PASS (16/16 classes; 1 honestly deferred) |
| Article 13 | PASS |
| Article 14 | PASS |
| No local-first | PASS |
| No fake-green | PASS (final status PARTIAL, decision D — refuses to over-authorize) |
| No implementation | PASS (no code/schema/runner/sandbox built) |
| No mutation | PASS (only KB design/report/checkpoint writes) |
| Next-step decision justified | PASS (D, with explicit A/B/C rejections) |
Critical item PARTIAL (Codex blocker closure) ⇒ final status INTERNAL_PROOF_PARTIAL per the macro's Track-12 rule. This is the honest ceiling: the proof closed everything internally closable; it cannot close the external owner/operator gate, and it refuses to pretend otherwise.
Final determination
- Final status:
INTERNAL_PROOF_PARTIAL - Production mutation: NO · Codex consulted: NO
- Build-readiness decision: D — TRUE_BLOCKER (owner/operator + resource). Binding blocker = sandbox host provisioning (M5/B4′); parallel recorded authority gate = B0‴ (owner may honor → Codex, or waive). A not reachable; B not required; C is not the load-bearing constraint.
- Minimal safe next step: Owner decision + provisioning — provision the §12.1 deny-by-default sandbox host (M5), and dispose of B0‴ (route to Codex or owner-waive with documented risk). Only then does an offline MVP prototype build (the next macro) become runnable. Do not implement, invoke, install, mutate, provision-by-Claude, or create a tool/schema/runner/sandbox.
Cross-references
- rev4 spec:
designs/implementation-package-dot-v0-1-gap-only-scope-spec-rev4-2026-06-09.{md,json}(§2, §4.0, §9, §10, §12, §21, §22) - rev4 plan:
planning/mvp-read-report-inspector-implementation-plan-no-code-rev4-2026-06-09.md(G1–G12, M1–M5, N1–N32) - rev4 matrix:
designs/acceptance-test-matrix-implementation-package-dot-v0-1-rev4-2026-06-09.md(L1–L5, #1–#45, D1–D11) - rev4 fix ledger:
reports/codex-fix-ledger-gap-only-spec-rev4-2026-06-09.md - rev4 FIX7 pilot:
designs/fix7-read-report-pilot-design-rev4-for-implementation-package-dot-v0-1-2026-06-09.md - rev4 Codex checkpoint packet (unsent/unanswered):
reviews/codex-checkpoint-packet-gap-only-spec-and-fix7-pilot-rev4-2026-06-09.md - Machine mirror of this proof:
reports/internal-evidence-proof-rev4-phase2-readiness-2026-06-09.json - Action-ready blockers:
checkpoints/action-ready-blockers-after-internal-proof-rev4-2026-06-09.md - Checkpoint:
checkpoints/checkpoint-internal-proof-rev4-phase2-readiness-2026-06-09.md - Constitution:
knowledge/dev/laws/constitution.md(NT13 Article 13, NT14 Article 14)