Hardcode Cleanliness Audit · 03 Runtime Hardcode Scan

doc 3 of 7 · 2026-05-20 · G2 gate

phase                : G2 — runtime hardcode scan
outcome              : G2 PASS — every PIN_* is a fail-closed drift detector,
                       not runtime business logic
production_mutation  : NONE

1. PIN_* and EXPECTED_* census (production code, cutter_agent/*.py)

File	Constant	Value	Class
prod_iu_adapter.py:49	PIN_MANIFEST_FILE_SHA	sha256 (7d56f3ce…)	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:51	PIN_MANIFEST_DIGEST	sha256 (9d908a62…)	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:53	PIN_CANDIDATE_COUNT	60	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:54	PIN_SOURCE_VERSION	icxconst-008a06ace23a96ea6cd456146e805c97	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:55	PIN_REGION_SHA	sha256 (17660443…)	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:57	PIN_WRITER_DIGEST	sha256 (d99a31d4…)	live drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:61	PIN_IU_COLS	19	live schema pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:62	PIN_UV_COLS	16	live schema pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:63	PIN_L1_MD5	md5 (f38c94d0…)	live trigger fn drift pin
prod_iu_adapter.py:64	PIN_L2_MD5	md5 (078ba005…)	live trigger fn drift pin
ledger_v2_canonical_cut.py:60-72	PIN_WRITER_DIGEST / PIN_MANIFEST_*…	imported from prod_iu_adapter (_P)	re-exports
ledger_v2_canonical_cut.py:69	PIN_CUT_COMMITTED_AT	2026-05-20T04:18:21.854512+00:00	leg-B M1 payload pin
ledger_v2_canonical_cut.py:72	PIN_CUT_STARTED_AT	2026-05-20T04:18:14+00:00	leg-B M1 payload pin
ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:76-77	PIN_CUT_COMMITTED_AT / PIN_LEGB_COMMITTED_AT	…	M2 verify payload pin
ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:101-105	PIN_M1_CHANGE_SET_ID / REVIEW_DECISION_ID / MANIFEST_ENVELOPE_ID / EXECUTOR_SIGNATURE_ID / PAYLOAD_HASH	UUIDs / sha256	M2 verify payload pin
ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:185	EXPECTED_SECTION_TYPE	{principle:15, section:3, article:42}	live cardinality pin (sums to 60)

2. Why these are ALLOWED under the policy

Policy excerpt:

allowed_with_conditions — "expected counts/hashes in tests when provenance-pinned and fail-closed"

Each PIN is consumed by _require_uuid / _require_int / _require_dict_equal helpers in ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py, which raise VerifyLiveStateMismatch on the slightest deviation. Concretely (lines 203-225):

_require_uuid(live_state, "change_set_id", PIN_M1_CHANGE_SET_ID)
_require_uuid(live_state, "review_decision_id", PIN_M1_REVIEW_DECISION_ID)
…
_require_int(live_state, "iu_count", PIN_CANDIDATE_COUNT)
_require_int(live_state, "uv_count", PIN_CANDIDATE_COUNT)
_require_int(live_state, "anchored_exact", PIN_CANDIDATE_COUNT)
_require_int(live_state, "dieu_44_intrusion", 0)
_require_dict_equal(live_state, "section_type_cardinality",
                    self.EXPECTED_SECTION_TYPE)

This is fail-closed verification, not runtime business logic. The runtime never trusts the PINs to compute anything; it refuses if the live state disagrees.

Provenance is explicit at point of use:

# ---- live drift pins (read-only catalog precheck, captured 2026-05-19) ----
PIN_IU_COLS = 19
…

and the equivalent # Pinned M1 ids — caller MUST supply the exact values that M1 persisted. comment in ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py.

3. os.environ usage in runtime

cutter_agent/cutwrite.py:480           if os.environ.get(bad):   # DB_ENV_GUARD refusal
cutter_agent/cutprod.py:148            if os.environ.get(bad):   # DB_ENV_GUARD refusal
cutter_agent/cutprod_canonical.py:141  if os.environ.get(bad):   # DB_ENV_GUARD refusal
cutter_agent/cutplan.py:285            if os.environ.get(bad):   # DB_ENV_GUARD refusal
cutter_agent/dryrun.py:475             if os.environ.get(bad):   # DB_ENV_GUARD refusal
cutter_agent/db_adapter.py:495,589,632 e = env if env is not None else os.environ  # injectable env (test-friendly)

All 6 usages are either env-guard refusals or injectable-env helpers — no os.environ["KEY"] accesses with default-fallback to a hardcoded secret. PASS.

4. Long-hex / UUID literals in runtime — exhaustive list

cutter_agent/ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:106  PIN_M1_PAYLOAD_HASH = "7468c7a9…6cfa"
cutter_agent/prod_iu_adapter.py:50              PIN_MANIFEST_FILE_SHA   = "7d56f3ce…"
cutter_agent/prod_iu_adapter.py:52              PIN_MANIFEST_DIGEST     = "9d908a62…"
cutter_agent/prod_iu_adapter.py:56              PIN_REGION_SHA          = "17660443…"
cutter_agent/prod_iu_adapter.py:58              PIN_WRITER_DIGEST       = "d99a31d4…"
cutter_agent/ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:101  PIN_M1_CHANGE_SET_ID         = "456c6830-…"
cutter_agent/ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:102  PIN_M1_REVIEW_DECISION_ID    = "29c88a7b-…"
cutter_agent/ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:103  PIN_M1_MANIFEST_ENVELOPE_ID  = "638cf363-…"
cutter_agent/ledger_v2_canonical_verify.py:104  PIN_M1_EXECUTOR_SIGNATURE_ID = "3a249063-…"

Every one is a PIN consumed by a _require_* fail-closed check. None is a credential / token / API key. None is used as a source of truth for runtime decisions — only as a refusal threshold.

Cross-reference: the same UUIDs are recorded in the KB post-enactment-closeout (doc 02 governance chain) — so the runbook audit trail and runtime fail-closed surface are aligned.

5. Things that COULD be hardcode but aren't

• No _SCHEMA = "public" reliance for write paths: schema name is pinned _SCHEMA = "public" in prod_iu_adapter.py:67 and used as an identifier allowlist (defence-in-depth identifier allowlists). This is a safety allowlist, not an assumption that the live schema is public — the adapter still surveys columns before writing.
• No hardcoded function md5s used as runtime decisions: fingerprints.yaml (KB-tracked) holds md5 pins; runtime never imports/reads it for decision-making.
• No hardcoded SQL bodies inside Python: lifecycle DDL lives in sql/lifecycle/*.sql and is operator-runbook (never auto-applied by CI).

6. Verdict

g2_outcome                : PASS
hardcoded_runtime_logic   : 0
pin_constants_total       : 15
pin_constants_fail_closed : 15  (100%)
pin_constants_unprovenanced: 0
os_environ_unsafe_uses    : 0
schema_identifiers_used   : as allowlists only (not assumed)

No remediation action required for G2.