S2E Commit-Gate Recommendation

Evidence-grounded recommendation for GPT/User. No decision is self-executed. 2026-05-19. Evidence: see raw-command-log + evidence-summary (this folder).

Established facts (from evidence)

F1 S2 targeted suite tests.test_cutplan_snapshot: 15/15 GREEN (exit 0).
F2 S2 entrypoint reproduces the ACCEPTED pinned identity in-test (manifest digest
   9d908a62…, file sha 7d56f3ce…, candidate_count 60, Điều 44 excluded) — per S2 report,
   targeted suite green corroborates.
F3 The single full-discover failure is PRE-EXISTING at ratified baseline afb7bfc: with the
   2 S2 files removed, the identical test (test_security_boundaries.py:118, assertNotIn
   'PGPASSWORD') still FAILS against the ratified cutter_agent/dryrun.py.
F4 S2 introduced NO regression; the failing test was outside the MARK CI gate of record
   (which was the targeted module suite, 21/21), so afb7bfc shipped this latent.
F5 Nothing committed/mutated; HEAD unchanged; only 2 untracked files; byte-exact restore.

Recommendation (priority order; each requires explicit GPT/User authorization)

PRIMARY → R1  RATIFY THE TARGETED-SUITE COMMIT GATE (consistent precedent).
  rationale: this is exactly the precedent already set by the ratified MARK entrypoint
    commit (afb7bfc), whose gate of record was tests.test_dryrun_snapshot_mark (21/21),
    not full-discover — the same latent security-test failure existed then and the commit
    was still ratified. Applying the same gate, the S2 commit of the 2 new untracked
    files is clean (15/15 green, py_compile OK, no-DB, branch/HEAD/tree precheck OK).
  action if authorized: commit ONLY cutter_agent/cutplan.py + tests/test_cutplan_snapshot.py
    on feature/constitution-snapshot-mark-dryrun (no merge/push/tag/deploy); record
    sha256 548eabc5… / 06e871e7… in the commit doc; open a SEPARATE pre-existing-defect
    remediation item for the over-broad security test vs the dryrun.py/cutplan.py DB-env
    guard token.

SECONDARY → R2  REMEDIATE FIRST, THEN COMMIT (cleanliness-maximal).
  scope (separately authorized, minimal): adjust tests/test_security_boundaries.py so the
    substring check excludes DB-env refusal-guard tuples (an env-var NAME the code refuses
    to read is not a hardcoded secret), OR equivalently refactor the guard token
    construction in BOTH dryrun.py and cutplan.py consistently. Then re-run full discover
    (expect 0 failures) and commit. NOTE: this touches the ratified dryrun.py and/or a
    security test — strictly out of S2 scope; needs its own gate + review.

NOT RECOMMENDED → R3  Block S2 indefinitely on a pre-existing, unrelated baseline defect:
  rejected — it would penalize S2 for a defect proven to exist without S2 and already
  tolerated at the ratified afb7bfc baseline.

Disposition

result: EVIDENCE_VERIFIED__S2_REPORT_ACCURATE__COMMIT_GATE_ROUTED_TO_GPT_USER
recommended: R1 (ratify targeted-suite gate; commit S2 two files; track security-test
  heuristic as a separate pre-existing remediation). R2 acceptable if GPT prefers
  remediate-first. Decision is GPT/User's.
forbidden_and_not_performed: edit/commit/CUT/VERIFY/DB/IU/Directus/vector/production/
  push/merge/tag/deploy/self-advance.
next_action: STOP. Route to GPT/User.

Nothing edited, committed, executed against production, or self-advanced.