KB-4B28

C1-DRYRUN-EXECUTION 10 — Internal Codex Negative Review (A1–A15) — 2026-06-22

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c1-dryrun-executioninternal-codex-negative-reviewa1-a15adversarialhold-uphelda1-a2-succeedregistration-hold2026-06-22

C1-DRYRUN-EXECUTION 10 — Internal Codex Negative Review (A1–A15) — 2026-06-22

Gate: REGISTRATION_HOLD · CAN_PROCEED = NO · 0 runtime mutations.

Posture: I do not trust this package's prose. I inspected the actual governed runtime read-only this session. I distinguish engineering PASS from authority PASS, and test/sandbox dry-run from production assembly. Rule: if any attack succeeds, the result is HOLD/REJECT — not READY.


Attack results

# Attack Finding Verdict
A1 dry-run did not actually execute TRUE. No C1 contract to dispatch; dispatcher raises on REAL_RUN; no tool to reach …:8090/dispatch; nothing executed (file 06). ATTACK SUCCEEDS → cannot be READY
A2 C1 contract not registered / not read-back TRUE. DOT_C1_*=0; no write channel; nothing registered (file 03). ATTACK SUCCEEDS → cannot be READY
A3 contract not C1-scoped No contract was created → nothing mis-scoped to exploit. does not apply (no contract)
A4 contract can write production No contract; and writes independently blocked (MCP 403, block_after_guard, read-only role). defended / does not apply
A5 manifest hash cannot be recomputed Sample value digest is recomputable (cser-v1 bytes+cmd); the manifest is honestly marked not-frozen (file 04), not falsely claimed recomputed. no overclaim
A6 authorization matching is loose Design uses exact set-equality + status='active'; live auth_total=0 so nothing to match loosely. defended
A7 no/generic/wrong authorization passes Impossible — no live verifier surface; auth_total=0 (file 05). defended (by absence)
A8 invalid value passes Impossible — no admission surface (file 07). defended (by absence)
A9 retry duplicates state No execution, 0 state (file 08). does not apply
A10 partial failure leaves orphan No execution, 0 state. does not apply
A11 rollback deletes / erases history No rollback executed; design = versioned-retire-not-delete (file 08). does not apply / defended
A12 bad input still emits PASS/digest/seal Impossible — no surface emits any (file 07). This is the critical fail-open check: it does not trigger. defended
A13 C2/C3 side effect exists 0 mutations; before==after; no non-C1 write (file 09). defended
A14 evidence cannot be read back Evidence is the read-only probe trail; before==after fully re-queryable. defended
A15 dry-run readiness overclaimed as production readiness Package states NOT READY, ready-for-production=NO, REGISTRATION_HOLD retained. No overclaim. defended

Conclusion

A1 and A2 succeed — by design of the honest outcome: the work did not execute a dry-run and did not register a contract, because the test/sandbox write channel/runtime is missing. Per the governing rule, a succeeding attack forbids READY. The package therefore does not report READY; it reports HOLD. No fail-open attack (A7/A8/A12) and no overclaim/side-effect attack (A13/A15) succeeds, so the result is HOLD, not REJECT.

Internal review verdict: HOLD upheld — C1_DRYRUN_HOLD_TEST_SANDBOX_AUTH_OR_RUNTIME_MISSING. READY is correctly withheld.

Boundary attestation

Adversarial review only; no mutation. REGISTRATION_HOLD retained; CAN_PROCEED = NO; 0 runtime mutations.

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