KB-26A6

12 — Internal Codex Negative Review (2026-06-22)

4 min read Revision 1

12 — Internal Codex Negative Review (adversarial) — 2026-06-22

LABELS: LOCAL_DISPOSABLE_SANDBOX_DOT_EMULATOR · NOT_GOVERNED_RUNTIME · NOT_PRODUCTION · NOT_DIRECTUS_GOVERNED_WRITE · NOT_A_SUBSTITUTE_FOR_DOT_C1_REGISTRATION

Each attack is run against the result; the verdict must survive. Where an attack would succeed against a broad READY claim, it is honored by withholding the broad claim and using the narrower verdict.

# Attack Finding Disposition
A1 missed capability route 16 routes surveyed incl. docker/native-pg/CLI/CI/secret-mgr/existing-lane; none stop-at-first-denial PASS — none missed
A2 sandbox not isolated dedicated cluster, own data_dir/port/socket, trust-local, no prod creds, destroyable PASS
A3 contract exists only as prose 11 executable functions + 7 contract rows read back; dry-run/apply executed PASS
A4 C1 scope not enforced wrong_carrier + c2_cross_mutation rejected; resolver C1-only PASS
A5 wiring absent sandbox wiring present & read back; governed wiring absent → disclosed as B-gap, not hidden PASS (honest)
A6 manifest hash not recomputable cross-tool shasum MATCH on 2123 bytes PASS
A7 authorization matching loose 11 distinct reject codes; exact carrier/plan/hash/action-set; single-use CAS PASS
A8 preflight false-ready preflight READY is sandbox readiness; governed readiness explicitly NOT claimed PASS (scoped)
A9 dry-run not actually routed dry-run uses the real dispatcher code path (shared with apply), not a stub PASS
A10 bad-input harness missing 19-case matrix executed PASS
A11 invalid input emits PASS/digest/seal aggregate any_seal=f, not_fail_closed=0 PASS
A12 rollback/clean-state unproven apply→single-use→write-once→dismantle→clean; orphan=0; audit retained PASS
A13 production touched governed BEFORE==AFTER; 0 mutations; only read-only + 1 denied write PASS
A14 C2/C3 touched only schema c1; cross-carrier rejected PASS
A15 evidence not read back sandbox + KB readback (file 11) PASS
A16 (added) sandbox masquerades as governed proof This is the central risk. Caught: every file labeled; A/B/C split; verdict is the narrow one PASS — by construction
A17 (added) new governed DOT created unrecorded → registry HOLD No governed DOT created; sandbox DOTs are category E, deliberately unregistered; HOLD precondition false PASS — HOLD does not apply
A18 (added) reuse-first skipped 309-tool registry searched; schema-ensure family + verifier pairing identified as reuse targets (file 04b) PASS

Adversarial conclusion

  • The sandbox-logic claims (A) survive every attack.
  • The attacks that would defeat a broad READY (A5/A8/A13/A16) are exactly why the broad READY is withheld. The honest verdict is the narrow one.
  • No READY_OVERCLAIM, no FAIL_OPEN, no SCOPE_DRIFT, no PRODUCTION_MUTATION, no C2_CROSS_MUTATION, no DOT_REGISTRY_NOT_UPDATED (no governed DOT created).
  • Internal review: PASS for the narrow verdict; correctly FAILS any attempt to assert governed-runtime readiness.
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